The ban on vertical restrictions applies to all “businesses,” including public entities performing non-governmental economic functions. Among the government`s sovereign missions are government activities dealing with nuclear energy, money, defence, space, etc. In other words, if a public body engages in economic activity, its conduct would be subject to review under the Competition Act. As a result, the ICC has recognized that a commitment agreement that does not have significant market power with the supplier of the binding product is unlikely to lead to aAEC in the markets in question. The ICC also recognized that agreements can translate into competitive advantages in assembly (economies of scale and scale), quality improvement and price inefficiency. For example, it decided that the commitment of warranty rights on cars to the purchase of compressed natural gas kits (CNG) was part of it; and oils and lubricants from designated suppliers would likely be considered a binding agreement within the meaning of Section 3.4)a) of the Competition Act (In re: FX Enterprises Solutions India Private Ltd/Hyundai Motors India Ltd) (Case 36 and 82 of 2014).) However, the ICC found that the connection agreements for the CNG kits were justified, as the CNG kits were specifically designed for Hyundai vehicles. In addition, the supplier has a legitimate interest in linking warranty requests to the use of certain brands of CNG kits as well as oils and lubricants, since the supplier would bear the warranty costs. The ICC is required to balance the likely competitive advantages with potential anti-competitive harm resulting from vertical restriction. Among the likely anti-competitive damages that the ICC can examine are: are there general exceptions to cartel and abuse of dominance legislation for certain types of agreements with vertical restrictions? If so, please describe. Unlike the vertical restrictions rules, the provisions of the Abuse of Dominant Position Act do not require, by law, that actual or potentially anti-competitive effects be proven or that efficiency gains are taken into account, while the behaviour of dominant firms is analysed. Although there have been some cases of an object-based approach (for example. B MCX Stock Exchange Ltd.
– Golds. v. National Stock Exchange of India Ltd. – Ors., Belaire Owners` Association v. DLF Ltd. – Ors.), it appears that the ICC`s subsequent decision-making practices have anti-competitive effects resulting from dominant behaviour and that these are possible efficiency gains resulting from such conduct. The ICC`s relevant review to identify price discrimination under the vertical restrictions rules should reflect its previous assessments of the abuse of dominance provisions – that is, the ICC will likely judge whether: (a) different prices apply to equivalent transactions; and b) to harm or harm competition in the market (Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCI-Ors. (Schott`s complaint)).
Given that the vertical restrictions rules in India expressly impose the AAEC`s evidence, it is likely that the burden of proof of real or probable competitive prejudice would be greater in such cases. 4.1 Please describe and comment on anything in your jurisdiction (or not covered above) with respect to vertical agreements and dominant companies. If the vertical class exemption is to apply, neither the supplier`s market share nor that of the buyer must exceed 30% of the relevant market for the products concerned. The extension of this threshold to the market share of buyers in all cases (see question 17) has significantly reduced the number of vertical agreements that can be protected under the safe port of the category exemption regulation. The ICC also recognizes the concept of individual economic unity and generally does not assign agreements between companies belonging to the same group to the review of Section 3 of the Act (which includes the prohibition of vertical restrictions).